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1. Introduction
Responding to concerns over high profile corpo-
rate collapses and aggressive earnings manage-
ment, authorities have introduced regulations to
improve the functioning of audit committees 
(e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX), Financial
Reporting Council, 2003 (FRC), Australian Stock
Exchange Corporate Governance Council, 2003
(ASX)). Membership is seen as a key factor to im-
prove audit committee effectiveness. For example,
some jurisdictions require all audit committees
members to be independent, others require a ma-
jority to be independent, and many require at least
one member who is a financial expert (e.g. SOX,
2002; FRC, 2003; European Commission, 2002;
Commonwealth of Australia, 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the char-
acteristics of firms that voluntarily adopt best prac-
tice guidelines for audit committee membership.
We examine the adoption of audit committee
membership in a context (i.e. New Zealand) where
there are best practice guidelines, but no regula-
tions for membership. Identifying characteristics
of firms that voluntarily adopt best practice guide-
lines for audit committee membership will provide
information for policy makers on the need for reg-
ulation and will identify the firms that will bear the
greatest costs if best practice membership require-
ments are imposed.
Our study contributes to the literature on audit
committees by focusing on a set of best practice
membership guidelines that are multidimensional.
Prior research typically focuses on specific aspects
of audit committee membership. For example,
Beasley and Salterio (2001: 550–551) examine
board characteristics that are related to audit com-
mittee independence and financial expertise, but
they examine independence and expertise in sepa-
rate models. In contrast, we identify audit commit-
tees that meet all three New Zealand Securities
Commission (NZSC, 2004: 20) guidelines (i.e. all
non-executive directors, a majority of independent
directors, and a member who is a financial expert).
Thus, our approach assumes that audit committees
will be more effective if they satisfy all three
membership criteria.
We examine the effect of demand and supply
variables on the formation of audit committees that
meet best practice guidelines for membership.
Similar to Beasley and Salterio (2001: 548), we
focus on the board supply factors because the
board is directly responsible for the composition of
the audit committee and forms the pool of mem-
bers from which it is drawn. For the demand fac-
tors, we focus on the impact of agency costs,
because high agency costs may create a demand
for high quality monitoring (e.g. a more effective
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audit committee).
Our findings indicate that as board size increas-
es and the proportion of independent board mem-
bers increases, the probability of having an audit
committee that meets best practice guidelines for
membership increases. On the other hand, we find
little evidence that demand factors (such as lever-
age, growth opportunities) are related to the for-
mation of audit committees that meet best practice
guidelines. Assuming that the unconstrained firm
will choose the best audit committee, given its
board structure, our results suggest that firms with
small boards and boards with more non-independ-
ent directors will bear the greatest costs if they are
required to comply with best practice require-
ments. For example, we estimate that the cost of
meeting the best practice audit committee mem-
bership guideline of at least one financial expert
may increase the median director’s fee by 80%
while the recommendation for an audit committee
with a majority of independent directors could in-
crease the median director’s fee by 19%.
The remainder of this study is structured as fol-
lows. We review and evaluate the prior literature
on audit committee membership in Section 2. In
Section 3, we develop the hypotheses, and in
Section 4, we describe the research design. The re-
sults are presented in Section 5, and discussed in
Section 6. In Section 7, the study is summarised
and conclusions made.
2. Prior literature
The board of directors has primary responsibility
for the financial statements which are prepared by
the accounting function. The board of directors
may delegate the responsibility for overview of the
financial reporting process and the external and in-
ternal audit functions to an audit committee in
which case there should be close communication
between the audit committee and the internal and
external auditors. Audit committees ‘alleviate the
agency problem by facilitating the timely release
of unbiased accounting information by managers
to shareholders, creditors and so on, thus reducing
the information asymmetry between insiders and
outsiders’ (Klein, 1998: 279). Bradbury (1990: 22)
also argues that audit committees reduce informa-
tion asymmetry between executive and non-exec-
utive board members.
The responsibilities of an audit committee in-
clude the oversight of an organisation’s financial
reporting, risk management and internal and exter-
nal audit functions; with the audit committee serv-
ing as the link between the board and these
functions (e.g. Wolnizer, 1995: 47–49; Co-ordinat-
ing Group on Audit and Accounting Issues, 2003).
Consistent with much of the prior research, we
focus on the audit committee’s role in monitoring
the financial reporting process.
Recommendations for improving the effective-
ness of audit committees have been made by a
number of groups including directors (NACD,
1999), chief executive officers (Business
Roundtable, 2002), professional accounting bodies
(NZICA, 2003), stock exchanges (Joint
Committee on Corporate Governance, 2001;
NYSE and NASD, 1999), international accounting
firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003) and gov-
ernment commissions (Ramsay, 2001). The rec-
ommendations often focus on improving the
independence and expertise of audit committee
members.
2.1. Audit committee independence
The board of directors is comprised of executive
(inside) and independent (outside) directors. Fama
and Jensen (1983: 314) explain that executive (in-
side) directors are internal managers who have
specific information about the firm. The role of in-
dependent (outside) board members is to resolve
disagreements between internal managers and to
exercise independent judgment in situations where
there are conflicts of interest between internal
managers and shareholders such as appointing and
compensating senior executives and reviewing fi-
nancial statements. The OECD (2004: 25) sup-
ports firms appointing independent non-executive
directors to deal with situations of conflicts of in-
terest such as financial reporting, board nomina-
tions, and executive and board remuneration.
The NYSE and NASD (1999: 19) comment that
non-executive directors that are independent of the
firm will help to ‘ensure the transparency and in-
tegrity of financial reporting’ and maintain in-
vestor confidence in capital markets. The US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
(1999: 23) claims an independent audit committee
will ‘promote the quality and reliability of a com-
pany’s financial statements’.
Audit committee independence is defined in var-
ious ways in listing requirements and best practice
guides (see, for example, NYSE and NASD, 1999;
SEC, 1999; ASX Corporate Governance Council,
2003). However, the general principle is that all or
a majority of directors on the audit committee
should be independent. Independent directors are
non-executive directors (i.e. they are not part of
management and they should not have any busi-
ness interests or other relationships that could in-
terfere with their ability to operate objectively).1
Researchers have examined the linkage between
audit committee independence and audit commit-
tee functions of overseeing financial reporting
quality, risk management and audit functions.
394 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1
‘Business interests’ include substantial shareholdings, and
‘other relationships’ include previous employment, customer
or supplier relationships or associations with management of
the company.
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These studies generally support the view of regu-
lators that independent directors strengthen finan-
cial reporting by reducing the likelihood of
fraudulent financial reporting and other financial
reporting irregularities (e.g. DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1991: 651; Dechow et al., 1996: 21;
Abbott and Parker 2000a: 60; Beasley et al.,
2000a, b: 18, 450; Peasnell et al., 2001: 308;
Abbott et al., 2004: 80). Audit committees that are
more independent are also associated with lower
levels of earnings management (e.g. Klein, 2002b:
389; Bedard et al., 2005: 29; Davidson et al., 2005:
256). Research evidence also suggests that inde-
pendent audit committees can have a positive ef-
fect on external and internal audit functions by:
appointing specialist external auditors (Abbott and
Parker, 2000b: 59), reducing questionable external
auditor switches (Abbott and Parker, 2002: 161;
Carcello and Neal, 2003: 107), monitoring the in-
dependence of external auditors (Abbott et al.,
2003: 226) and by interacting more with internal
auditors (Raghunandan et al., 2001: 112;
Scarbrough et al., 1998: 58).
Researchers have also investigated the charac-
teristics of firms with independent audit commit-
tees. Audit committee independence is negatively
associated with firm growth opportunities. The fi-
nancial statements for firms with growth opportu-
nities are considered to be less relevant to users so
the demand for monitoring them is lower (Deli and
Gillan, 2000: 430–431). Cotter and Silvester
(2003: 224) find that audit committee independ-
ence is negatively related to firm leverage.
However, leverage is not significant in other stud-
ies (Menon and Williams, 1994: 36, Deli and
Gillan, 2000: 440, Klein, 2002a: 446, Beasley and
Salterio, 2001: 559). Prior research also shows no
significant association between audit committee
independence and earnings performance, dividend
payout, auditor type, industry regulation, or the
number of segments within a firm or the firm’s
stock exchange listing (Cotter and Silvester, 2003;
226; Beasley and Salterio, 2001: 559; Deli and
Gillan, 2000: 439).
In terms of board-related variables, audit com-
mittee independence is positively related to the
percentage of independent directors on the board
(e.g. Menon and Williams, 1994: 135–6; Beasley
and Salterio, 2001: 556–562; Klein, 2002a: 446;
Cotter and Silvester, 2003: 226) and to board size
(Beasley and Salterio, 2001: 556–562, Klein,
2002a: 446). Blockholders on the board or on the
audit committee are found to reduce the need for
independent audit committees (e.g. Beasley and
Salterio, 2001: 559; Klein, 2002a: 445). There is
some evidence that audit committees are less inde-
pendent if the CEO is the chair of the board
(Beasley and Salterio, 2001: 559). Only one study
has found a relationship between director owner-
ship and audit committee independence (Deli and
Gillan, 2000: 439). A CEO on the compensation
committee, which is a surrogate for the CEO’s in-
fluence over the board, has no impact on audit
committee independence (Klein, 2002a: 445).
2.2. Audit committee director financial expertise
An audit committee’s monitoring role includes
reviewing financial statements and assessing the
degree of aggressiveness and conservatism of the
accounting policies and accounting estimates. In
the US, SOX (2002: section 204) requires auditors
of issuers to report to the audit committee on ‘all
critical accounting policies and practices to be
used, all alternative treatments of financial infor-
mation within generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples that have been discussed with management’.
Given the complexities of business and the re-
sponsibility of audit committees to monitor the in-
tegrity of the financial statements, regulatory
bodies have raised concerns about the knowledge
and experience of audit committee members. In
1994, the Advisory Panel on Auditor
Independence (1994: 15) supported the findings of
the Institute of Internal Auditors that ‘the effec-
tiveness of audit committees is affected first and
foremost by the expertise of members of audit
committees in the areas of accounting and finan-
cial reporting, internal controls and auditing’.
Arthur Levitt (1998: 7), former SEC chairman,
recognised the need for audit committee members
to have appropriate backgrounds, stating that
‘qualified, committed, independent and tough-
minded audit committees represent the most reli-
able guardians for the public interest’. The BRC
(NYSE and NASD 1999: 12) recommended that
independent audit committee directors should be
financially literate and have at least one director
with accounting or related financial management
expertise. These recommendations are incorporat-
ed into legislation in the US (SOX, section 407)
and by elsewhere (e.g. FRC, ASX).
The importance of financial expertise in moni-
toring financial reporting is supported in research
by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993: 37). Firms with
audit committee members who have financial ex-
pertise are less likely to be subject to censure for
poor financial reporting (Agrawal and Chadha,
2004: 19; Farber, 2005: 551; McMullen and
Raghunandan, 1996: 80), more likely to have high-
er quality earnings (Qin, 2007: 18) and more like-
ly to reduce earnings management for firms with
weaker corporate governance mechanisms
(Carcello et al., 2006: 23). In addition, audit com-
mittees with financial experts are more likely to
promote more conservative financial reporting
when the overall board corporate governance is
strong (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008: 24), and
financial experts, with audit knowledge, are more
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 395
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likely to support the external auditor in disputes
with management relating to ‘substance over
form’ issues (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001: 41).
Nonetheless, there is limited research on the
characteristics of firms that have audit committees
with financial expertise and those that do not.
Beasley and Salterio (2001: 562) show that inde-
pendent directors with financial reporting and
audit committee knowledge are more likely to be
appointed by firms with larger boards, and by
those with a higher proportion of independent di-
rectors, but are less likely to be appointed by firms
where the board is chaired by the CEO. DeFond et
al. (2004: 176) find that the US capital market re-
acts favourably when individuals with accounting
expertise are appointed to audit committees.2
However, the reaction is only positive if the ex-
perts are independent and the firm has strong cor-
porate governance in place before the new
directors are appointed. This suggests that ac-
counting expertise on audit committees may only
add value if other firm characteristics facilitate its
use.
2.3. Best practice guidelines in New Zealand
Following overseas jurisdictions, in late 2003
the New Zealand stock exchange (NZX) intro-
duced recommendations for audit committee
membership. In 2004, the NZSC developed a set
of corporate governance principles (NZSC, 2004:
11). The NZSC’s principles (which are more strin-
gent than the NZX’s) recommend that audit com-
mittees comprise all non-executive directors, have
a majority of independent directors, and have a
member who is an accounting expert.3 We refer to
audit committees that satisfy all three of these rec-
ommendations as ‘best practice’ audit committees.
3. Hypotheses
In developing hypotheses for the voluntary adop-
tion of best practice audit committees, we consid-
er both demand and supply factors. It is
hypothesised that firms with potentially high
agency costs are more likely to voluntarily form
best practice audit committees for monitoring pur-
poses. That is, if audit committees are formed to
enhance the credibility of financial statements,
they will be more useful when financial statements
are used for monitoring purposes. Supply factors
include board size and the proportion of independ-
ent directors on the board, which reflects the abil-
ity of the firm to appoint directors who possess the
required audit committee member characteristics.
Thus, our main objective is to determine whether
the demand or supply factors dominate in deter-
mining the composition of the audit committee –
or whether the demand and supply factors have
similar effects. If demand factors dominate, this
would suggest that the market will force firms to
adopt best practice membership guidelines.
However, if supply factors dominate, firms are un-
likely to adopt such guidelines as doing so would
require that the firm alters other aspects of its gov-
ernance structure (e.g. enlarge its board, increase
the proportion of independent directors on the
board).
3.1. Demand factors
Leverage
Agency costs arise with the use of debt as there
are potential conflicts between shareholders and
debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 333–343).
To mitigate these conflicts, covenants are typical-
ly written into debt contracts requiring firms to
supply audited financial statements and a certifi-
cate confirming compliance with the covenants
(e.g. Smith and Warner, 1979: 125). As violating
debt covenants can be costly for a firm, managers
have incentives to avoid breaking them (e.g. Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986: 210–217). Empirical re-
search suggests that managers make accounting
choices to affect the calculations used to determine
compliance with debt covenants (e.g. Healey and
Whalen, 1999: 376). Such accounting choices in-
clude making income-increasing changes around
the time of default (Sweeney, 1994: 293) and
changing accounting policies (Beatty and Weber,
2002: 134).
Directors have a responsibility to ensure the in-
tegrity of the financial statements provided to
debtholders and to monitor compliance with debt
covenant provisions. The demand for this type of
monitoring should increase as the level of debt and
the risk of managers manipulating accounting
choices to ensure compliance with debt covenants
increases. When debt levels are high, we expect
that boards will voluntarily establish independent
audit committees with financial expertise to reas-
sure debtholders that the audit committee is effec-
tively monitoring the reporting process. Based on
the argument that effective monitoring by audit
committees can reduce agency costs for firms with
high debt levels, it is hypothesised that:
H1 Firms with higher levels of debt are more
likely to voluntarily appoint audit commit-
tees that meet best practice membership
guidelines.
Executive director shareholding
Another need to monitor management arises
from the separation of ownership and management
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 309). As executive
396 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 An accounting expert is a director with experience as a
public accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, controller,
principal or chief accounting officer.
3 The NZX’s Best Practice Code requires issuers to establish
audit committees consisting solely of non-executive directors.
It does not refer to independent directors or financial expertise.
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director share ownership increases, managers’ and
shareholders’ incentives are more closely aligned,
thus reducing agency costs and the level of moni-
toring required (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997:
240). Empirical research shows that at lower lev-
els of ownership, managers may become involved
in activities that do not add value to shareholders
such as time-wasting and diverting resources to
unprofitable projects (e.g. Morck et al., 1988;
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991: 106; Holderness et
al., 1999: 459).4 It is hypothesised that:
H2 Firms where executive directors have a high-
er share ownership are less likely to volun-
tarily appoint audit committees that meet
best practice membership guidelines.
Blockholders
Blockholders, who own substantial amounts of a
firm’s shares (defined in this study at 5% or more
of the issued shares), have sufficient financial in-
centives to monitor the performance of manage-
ment. They also have voting power that, if
required, can be used to take action (e.g. Jensen,
1993: 867, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 754–755).
Prior research indicates that blockholders have a
positive influence on the formation of an audit
committee (Bradbury, 1990: 23). Blockholders on
audit committees are likely to mitigate earnings
management (Bedard et al., 2005: 25).
Furthermore, firms subject to SEC enforcement
actions are less likely to have blockholders
(Dechow et al., 1996: 21) while firms that over-
state earnings have more diffuse ownership
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991: 653). Beasley and
Salterio (2001: 559) find blockholders on the
board are negatively associated with audit com-
mittee independence. Similarly, Klein (2002a:
445) finds audit committee independence declines
when blockholders are represented on the audit
committee.
On the basis that substantial blockholders are
considered substitute monitoring mechanisms for
audit committee independence and financial ex-
pertise, it is hypothesised that:
H3 Firms with blockholders on the board of di-
rectors are less likely to voluntarily appoint
audit committees that meet best practice
membership guidelines.
Big Five auditors
Use of a Big Five auditor is likely to reflect high-
er agency costs and a greater demand for high
quality financial statements (e.g. Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986). Eichenseher and Shields
(1985: 25–27) provide evidence that newly hired
small audit firms are reluctant to encourage audit
committee formation because audit committees
have a preference for large audit firms. It is likely
that large audit firms will also promote best audit
committee practice. Hence:
H4 Firms with large audit firms are more likely
to voluntarily appoint audit committees that
meet best practice membership guidelines.
Market to book
Deli and Gillan (2000: 440) and Klein (2002a:
445) find that growth opportunities are significant-
ly and negatively related to audit committee inde-
pendence. A potential reason for this is that
financial statements are a more important monitor-
ing mechanism for firms with assets-in-place rela-
tive to growth opportunities. Given that a major
function of an audit committee is to increase the
credibility of financial statements, it follows that
best practice audit committees will be more (less)
useful for firms with higher assets-in-place (lower
growth opportunities).
H5 Firms with a higher proportion of growth op-
portunities are less likely to voluntarily ap-
point audit committees that meet best
practice membership guidelines.
3.2. Supply factors
Board size
Small boards are easy to manage and free riders
are more easily identified compared to large
boards. Jensen (1993: 865) advocates appointing
small boards because boards with more than seven
or eight members are not effective and are easier
for the CEO to control. For example, as board size
increases, the likelihood of financial statement
fraud increases (Beasley, 1996: 462).
Large boards may be a sign of more complex
governance issues that require delegation to spe-
cialist committees such as a high quality audit
committee to improve the board’s responsiveness
and improve oversight. Similarly, independent di-
rectors are more likely to demand high quality
monitoring of financial reporting to enhance their
own reputations (Fama, 1980: 294).
Establishing separate committees enables a
board to focus on specific areas of responsibility
where the skills and knowledge of directors can be
maximised and the workload shared (e.g. NZSC,
2004: 20). As boards increase in size, the ability to
appoint independent directors with expertise in
various areas, including financial expertise, in-
creases. The empirical evidence shows that audit
committee independence increases with board size
(e.g. Klein, 2002a: 445) and that larger boards are
more likely to establish audit committees which
exceed minimum legal requirements for independ-
ence and financial expertise (Beasley and Salterio,
2001: 559–563).
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 397
4 However, Morck et al.’s (1988) results suggest that exces-
sive levels of managerial ownership could also lead to en-
trenchment and suboptimal behaviour.
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Based on these arguments, we hypothesise that:
H6 Firms with larger boards are more likely to
voluntarily appoint audit committees that
meet best practice membership guidelines.
Independent board directors
Information asymmetries exist between execu-
tive and independent directors because executive
directors usually have more information about a
firm than independent directors. Independent di-
rectors have incentives to seek this information
and enhance their reputations as monitors (Fama,
1980: 294).
Although independent directors may have less
information about a firm, they are also less influ-
enced by the CEO, and are more likely to evaluate
financial reports more objectively (e.g. NYSE and
NASD 1999: 22) and to hold directors more ac-
countable for financial results (e.g. Committee on
Corporate Governance, 1998: 7). Empirical re-
search suggests that having independent directors
on the audit committee improves the quality of fi-
nancial reporting. Firms investigated for fraudu-
lent reporting or financial irregularities often have
boards dominated by executive directors (Dechow
et al., 1996: 21). Firms with a high percentage of
independent board directors are less likely to have
financial reporting problems (e.g. Beasley, 1996:
455; Peasnell et al., 2001: 308; Song and
Windram, 2004: 203).
As the proportion of independent directors on
the board increases, it is more likely for an audit
committee to include more independent directors
(e.g. Menon and Williams, 1994: 137) and inde-
pendent directors with financial reporting and
audit committee knowledge (Beasley and Salterio,
2001: 562).
On the evidence of prior research that independ-
ent directors improve the quality of financial re-
porting monitoring, we hypothesise that:
H7 Firms with a higher proportion of independ-
ent directors on their boards are more likely
to voluntarily appoint audit committees that
meet best practice membership guidelines.
4. Research design
4.1. Model and variables
We use a logit model to test the relation between
and demand and supply factors and the likelihood
that audit committees will meet specified member-
ship criteria. The logit model is specified in equa-
tion (1):
ACBP = β0 + β1LEV+ β2EXDIRSH + (1)
β3BLOCK + β4BIG5 + β5MTB + 
β6BDSIZE + β7BDIND
where ACBP is an indicator variable that is equal
to 1 if a firm has a best practice audit committee
comprised of all non-executive directors, consist-
ing of a majority of independent directors, and in-
cluding an accounting expert, and 0 otherwise.5
This definition is consistent with the NZSC (2004)
principles and guidelines and the ASX require-
ments but is more stringent than the NZX (2003)
best practice code and less rigorous than the SOX
and FRC requirements.6
For classification purposes, a non-executive di-
rector is a director who is not a member of senior
management at the firm. An independent director
is defined as one who is not employed or closely
affiliated with the company. It excludes a non-
executive director who is a past employee of the
company and/or has significant or business 
relationships with the firm. A director with a sub-
stantial equity holding is not considered an inde-
pendent director even if not active in the
management of the company. The definition of an
independent director is consistent with that recom-
mended by the NYSE and NASD (1999: 10–11).
We read annual report disclosures, in particular the
related party disclosures in the notes to the finan-
cial statements, to determine whether each director
is an independent director.
We also determine whether each director has fi-
nancial expertise. We classify directors who are
qualified as a chartered accountant (CA) as having
financial expertise.7 We use a directory maintained
by the New Zealand Institute of Chartered
Accountants to identify CA-qualified directors.
We also report the results of equation (1) using
two alternative dependent variables (i.e. measures
of audit committee composition). Audit committee
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5 Firm and time subscripts are omitted from equation 1, for
ease of exposition.
6 The NZSC (2004) and ASX Corporate Governance
Council (2003) recommend audit committees comprise all
non-executive directors, the majority of whom are independ-
ent, with at least one director who is a chartered accountant or
has another recognised form of financial expertise, and a
chairperson who is independent and not the chairperson of the
board. The NZX (2003) recommends that an audit committee
consist solely of non-executive directors. No reference is
made to financial expertise. SOX (2002) section 301 requires
public company audit committees to be independent of man-
agement, and in section 407 SEC registrants must disclose
whether or not the audit committee has at least one financial
expert. The FRC Combined Code (2003) requires audit com-
mittees of at least three members (two members for smaller
companies) who are independent non-executive directors with
at least one member having recent and relevant financial ex-
perience.
7 This definition is largely consistent with the NZSC (2004)
view but is narrower than that legislated in the SOX Act. The
SOX Act definition includes presidents and chief executive of-
ficers as financial experts because it was considered that a nar-
row definition would limit the pool of qualified directors able
to be appointed as experts (DeFond et al., 2004). The narrow-
er definition of an accounting expert is adopted in this study
because of a lack of consistency in the disclosure of directors’
backgrounds in company annual reports.
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independence (ACIND) is coded 1 if the audit
committee is comprised of a majority of independ-
ent directors and 0 if it is not. Audit committee ac-
counting expertise (ACEXP) is equal to 1 if at
least one member is a member of a professional
accounting body and 0 otherwise. This also allows
us to investigate whether the same agency cost fac-
tors and board characteristics drive firms’ deci-
sions to add independent members and to add
members with expertise.
For the independent variables, debt (LEV) is the
ratio of borrowings to firm size.8 The cumulative
percentage of shares held by executive directors as
a percentage of the total shares issued is the meas-
ure of executive director share ownership
(EXDIRSH). BLOCK is the percentage of shares
issued to shareholders who each have at least 5%
of the issued shares of a company. BIG5 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm employs a
large auditor and 0 otherwise. Growth opportuni-
ties are measured using a market to book ratio
(MTB). Board size (BDSIZE) is the number of in-
dividuals serving on the board of directors and
BDIND is the percentage of independent directors
on the board of directors. We do not explicitly con-
trol for firm size since board size and firm size are
highly correlated (r = 0.61).
4.2. Sample and data
We select New Zealand companies listed on the
NZX main trading board as reported in the 2001
Investment Guide (Datex Services Limited, 2001).
We choose 2001 because we want to focus on the
firm’s voluntary decision to adopt a best practice
membership audit committee. Thus, we need a pe-
riod that is uncontaminated by external forces that
might have led firms to adopt a best practice mem-
bership guidelines. For example, the overseas’ re-
sponses to the collapse of firms like Enron and
WorldCom (e.g. changes in stock exchange listing
rules, enactment of the SOX Act) that began to ap-
pear from 2002 could have created pressure for
firms to improve their corporate governance, even
though formal responses did not appear in New
Zealand until 2003. Using 2001 data gives us a
cleaner test of firm’s incentives to choose a high
quality audit committee that possess best practice
elements.
Our initial sample is 109 firms. We exclude a
unit trust and a large insurance and banking com-
pany because the governance and financial struc-
tures of these entities differs from that of most
other company organisations.9 Eight firms are ex-
cluded because of delisting. We omit 19 firms that
did not provide sufficient data such as audit com-
mittee details. Finally, we eliminate 24 firms that
are listed on overseas stock exchanges where audit
committee composition might be regulated. This
results in a final sample of 56 firms. Table 1 sum-
marises the sample selection.
We obtain financial data from Datex. The audit
committee data was hand-collected from annual
reports. Where information on audit committee
members was incomplete, a letter was sent to the
listed company requesting the information.10 We
use company press releases and websites to obtain
the qualifications of directors if they were not dis-
closed in the annual reports. We use the website of
the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants
to determine if directors on the audit committees
were members of the national professional ac-
counting body. However, we acknowledge that
this process did not identify directors who have an
accounting certification from an overseas profes-
sional accounting body.
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Table 1
Sample selection
# of firms
Initial sample 109
Less: Unit trust and finance companies (2)
Less: Firms delisted (8)
Less: Firms with audit committees but no details on composition (9)
Less: Firms that did not disclose if they had an audit committee or not (7)
Less: Firms with a lack of data (3)
Less: Firms with an overseas stock exchange listing (24)
Final sample 56
8 Firm size is measured as the market value of equity plus
the carrying amount of total liabilities.
9 Unit trusts are investment vehicles whereby funds are in-
vested by investors and managed by professional portfolio
managers in accordance with agreed investment objectives.
10 89 companies were sent a letter requesting additional in-
formation. A total of 54 responses were received representing
a response rate of 60.67%.
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 2 Panels A and B reports the descriptive
statistics of the dependent variables used in this
study. Of the 56 listed companies, 67.9% (38
firms) have an accounting expert on the committee
(ACEXP) and 51.8% (29 firms) of the firms have
a majority of independent directors (ACIND).
There are 22 firms (39.3%) that meet both these
requirements. There are 19 firms (33.9%) that
meet audit committee best practice membership
guidelines audit committees (ACBP). The percent-
age of firms with independent audit committees
(ACIND) is lower than the US (86.7% in Klein,
2002a: 442), but similar to Australia (64.2% in
Cotter and Silvester, 2003: 219).
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the
explanatory variables. The mean for LEV is 0.312.
On average, executive directors (EXDIRSH) own
3.5% of the issued shares and blockholding share-
holders (BLOCK) own 47.3% of issued shares.
Eighty-seven percent of firms employ a Big Five
auditor. The average market to book ratio is 1.6.
Boards have a mean size of 5.9 directors (BSIZE),
and 52% of the boards have a majority of inde-
pendent directors (BIND).
Table 4 reports the results of Mann-Whitney uni-
variate tests of the explanatory variables. We em-
ploy nonparametric tests because of the small
sample size and because they require no assump-
tions about the normality of the data. We report a
Mann Whitney U tests for the continuous variables
and a chi-square for the Big Five indicator vari-
able.
Leverage (LEV) is weakly significant (i.e. p >
0.05) and negatively related to audit committee
quality across all three measures. This suggests that
leverage and audit committees may be substitute
monitoring mechanisms. Specifically, debtholders
have incentives to monitor the firm directly, and
debt can reduce the firm’s free cash flows (Jensen,
1986: 324) which imposes discipline on the 
managers. Executive directors’ shareholdings
(EXDIRSH) is only weakly significant (at 0.10
level) for independent audit committees (ACIND).
While this positive relation is contrary to expecta-
tions, EXDIRSH is not significant in the ACBP or
ACIND models and is not significant in the multi-
variate tests. Thus, in general EXDIRSH and audit
committees are unrelated. There is a weak nega-
tive relation between blockholders (BLOCK) and
an audit committee with accounting expertise
(ACEXP) which provides support for the view that
blockholders and audit committees are substitutes.
Neither BIG5 nor MTB are related to audit com-
mittee quality. One reason might be that BIG5 and
MTB are relatively noisy proxies for audit quality
and growth opportunities. There is a strong posi-
tive relation between board size (BDSIZE) and in-
dependent and best practice membership audit
committees, but not expertise. As expected, board
independence (BDIND) is positively and signifi-
cantly related to audit membership across all three
measures.
Table 5 reports the bivariate correlations be-
tween the independent variables. The significant
correlation between MTB and leverage is as ex-
pected (Myers, 1977). There are also significant
correlations between EXDIRSH and BLOCK,
EXDIRSH and BDIND, and LEV and BIG5. None
of these correlations suggest that multicollinearity
will be a major problem; nevertheless, we under-
take additional analysis to address this issue.
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Table 2
Description of dependent variables
Panel A: Means Label Mean N
Audit committee with accounting expert ACEXP 0.679 38
Independent audit committee ACIND 0.518 29
Best practice audit committee ACBP 0.339 19
Panel B: Relation between ACEXP and ACIND
ACIND 0 1 Total
ACEXP 0 11 7 18
1 16 22 38
Total 27 29 56
ACBP is 1 if a company has an audit committee with all non-executive directors, with a majority (greater 
than 50%) of independent directors and a director with a professional accounting qualification, 0 otherwise.
ACIND is 1 if a company has an audit committee, with greater than 50% independent directors, 0 otherwise.
ACEXP is 1 if a company has an audit committee with a member holding a professional accounting qualifica-
tion, 0 otherwise. The sample size is 56.
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5.2. Multivariate analysis
Table 6 presents the results of a logit regression
for each measure of best practice for audit com-
mittee membership: ACBP, ACEXP and ACIND.
Our main focus is on ACBP. In this regression, the
model Nagelkerke R2 is 59.8% which compares
favourably with similar studies such as Klein
(2002a: 446) who reports an adjusted R2 of 24%.
The only demand variable that is significant is
market to book (MTB), which is weakly and neg-
atively significant (at 0.10). Both supply variables,
board size and board independence are positively
and significantly related to ACBP at 0.05 and 0.01
levels, respectively. This indicates that, consistent
with H6 and H7, firms with large boards and firms
with independent boards are more likely to create
audit committees that conform to best practice
standards.
The logit regressions for ACEXP and ACIND
are also significant. The explanatory power for
ACIND of 52.9% is similar to the ACBP model.
However, the explanatory power of ACEXP is
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Label Mean Std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Leverage LEV 0.312 0.232 0.438 0.000 3.114
Executive director EXDIRSH 0.035 0.003 0.073 0.000 0.326
shareholding
Blockholding BLOCK 0.473 0.503 0.265 0.000 0.898
Big Five BIG5 0.875 1.000 0.334 0.000 1.000
Market to book MTB 1.602 1.055 1.376 0.459 7.865
Board size BDSIZE 5.946 6.000 1.995 3.000 11.000
Board independence BDIND 0.520 0.470 0.239 0.000 1.000
LEV is the ratio of borrowings to firm size (the market value of equity plus carrying amount of total liabili-
ties). EXDIRSH is the total number of shares held by executive directors as a percentage of the total shares is-
sued. BLOCK is measured as the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, each with more than a 5% of
the firm’s issued shares and represented on the board of directors. BIG5 is 1 if a firm has a Big Five auditor, 
0 otherwise. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. BDSIZE is the number of individuals serving on the board of
directors, and BDIND the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. The sample size is 56.
Table 4
Univariate tests of explanatory variables
ACBP ACEXP ACIND
Predicted Test Test Test
sign Test statistic p-value statistic p-value statistic p-value
LEV + MWU –1.705 (0.044) –1.930 (0.027) –1.550 (0.061)
EXDIRSH – MWU 1.249 (0.106) 0.070 (0.472) 1.348 (0.089)
BLOCK – MWU –0.554 (0.290) –1.571 (0.058) 0.591 (0.277)
BIG5 + CS 0.421 (0.516) 0.421 (0.516) 0.255 (0.614)
MTB – MWU 0.078 (0.469) 0.333 (0.369) 0.746 (0.228)
BDSIZE + MWU 2.507 (0.006) 0.924 (0.178) 3.297 (0.000)
BDIND + MWU 3.845 (0.000) 2.006 (0.022) 3.610 (0.000)
The variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. A nonparametric Mann Whitney U test (MWU) is employed for
continuous variables and a chi-square test (CS) is reported for the binary BIG5 variable. Except for the CS test,
p-values are one-tailed. A negative test statistic indicates that where the dependent variable (ACBP, ACEXP,
or ACIND) is 0, this group of observations has a higher mean rank than where the dependent variable is 1.
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lower at 35.3% which suggests that the appoint-
ment of accounting experts to audit committees is
related to other demand and supply factors yet to
be explored.
When ACIND or ACEXP are used as the de-
pendent variable, the supply variables (BDSIZE
and BDIND) are also supported. Independent
boards (H7) are more likely to choose audit com-
mittees that have accounting experts and that are
independent. Board size (H6) is supported for
ACIND, but not for ACEXP.
In contrast to the results for ACBP, LEV is sig-
nificantly related to ACEXP and ACIND, but in
both cases, the positive coefficient is opposite to
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Table 5
Spearman correlations matrix
LEV EXDIRSH BLOCK BIG 5 MTB BDSIZE BDIND
LEV –0.016 –0.118 –0.165 –0.285* –0.156 –0.076
EXDIRSH –0.027 –0.361** –0.074 0.228 0.233 0.272*
BLOCK –0.064 –0.135 –0.048 –0.013 0.148 –0.231
BIG5 –0.349** –0.018 –0.072 0.062 0.183 –0.094
MTB 0.195 –0.025 –0.062 0.055 –0.014 0.087
BDSIZE –0.149 0.238 0.165 0.181 –0.102 0.224
BDIND 0.113 0.105 –0.226 –0.117 0.008 0.156
The variables are described in Table 3. Spearman rank correlations are reported above the diagonal and Pearson
correlations are reported below the diagonal. The sample size is 56. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.05 and
0.01 levels, respectively. p-values are two-tailed.
Table 6
Logit regression results
Model: ACBP ACEXP ACIND
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
sign (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Constant –7.362 0.947 –6.702
(0.016) (0.298) (0.004)
LEV H1 + –1.902 –3.384 –1.816
(0.199) (0.029) (0.096)
EXDIRSH H2 – 4.284 –5.620 0.347
(0.208) (0.123) (0.472)
BLOCK H3 – 0.541 –2.815 2.498
(0.371) (0.041) (0.077)
BIG5 H4 + 0.649 –0.230 0.138
(0.321) (0.415) (0.455)
MTB H5 – –1.165 0.100 –0.046
(0.085) (0.351) (0.452)
BDSIZE H6 + 0.446 0.174 0.353
(0.033) (0.180) (0.035)
BDIND H7 + 8.800 3.098 7.918
(0.001) (0.038) (0.001)
–2 Log likelihood 40.1 54.0 49.3
Nagelkerke R2 0.598 0.353 0.529
% Predicted correct 82.1 82.1 76.8
The variables are described in Table 3. The sample size is 56. p-values are one-tailed.
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that hypothesised. This suggests that high leverage
firms are less likely to have a best practice audit
committee. One reason for this result might be that
leverage acts as a substitute for an audit committee
as a monitoring mechanism. First, debt provides
discipline for managers by reducing free cash
flows (Jensen, 1986: 324). Second, lenders can di-
rectly monitor the firm’s financial performance
which obviates the need for an independent audit
committee or an audit committee that has financial
expertise.
While BLOCK is not significant in the ACBP
model, it is significant in both ACEXP and ACIND
models. However, in the ACEXP and ACIND
models the signs are both significant and different,
thereby cancelling the effect in the ACBP model.
This suggests the role of blockholders in monitor-
ing arrangements and governance is more complex
than that hypothesised (H3). A rationale for this re-
sult is that blockholding directors will seek to be
on audit committees to have direct access to the
auditors and reduce the information asymmetry
between the blockholding directors and the inter-
nal directors (Bradbury, 1990: 22). The results are
consistent with blockholding directors being sub-
stitutes for expert, but not independent, directors
on audit committees.
Growth opportunities (MTB) is significant in the
ACBP model, but not in either the ACIND or
ACEXP models. This may reflect the highly dis-
cretionary nature of growth opportunities, which
requires a need for audit committee directors with
both greater independence and greater expertise.
Alternatively, MTB might be a noisy proxy for
growth opportunities, which can reduce the mod-
els’ explanatory power.
In summary, the results indicate that the proba-
bility that a best practice audit committee is estab-
lished increases as board size increases and as
board independence increases. Thus, it seems that
the supply factors dominate the demand-related
factors in determining the likelihood of a firm hav-
ing an audit committee that meets best practice
guidelines.
5.3. Additional analysis
This section summarises additional work under-
taken to assess the robustness of the results to ad-
ditional variables and to potential concerns about
multicollinearity and endogeneity bias.
Alternative sample and independent variables
In the reported results, we eliminate firms that
are listed overseas because they are more likely to
be affected by overseas local listing rules.
However, this raises a concern over the small sam-
ple size on which the logit analysis in Table 6 is
undertaken. We therefore increased the sample by
including the 24 companies that are also listed on
overseas stock exchanges (see Table 1) and in-
cluded a dummy variable for the overseas ex-
change listing. The results (untabulated) are simi-
lar to those reported. Large or independent boards
are more likely to have a best practice audit com-
mittee. The exchange listing dummy variable is
not significant.
In our main tests, we exclude firm size as a con-
trol variable from the reported results because
Bradbury (1990: 29) shows that it is highly corre-
lated to board size. He reports that size does not
make a marginal contribution to the decision to
maintain an audit committee once the number of
directors has been considered. Furthermore, given
the sample size, we wished to make the model as
parsimonious as possible. We examine whether
our results are sensitive to the inclusion of a firm
size variable. When this is included, board size be-
comes insignificant while board independence re-
mains significant. Thus, consistent with our priors,
including firm size swamps the board size effect.
We also create a dummy variable for blockhold-
ing to test whether it was the existence of a block-
holder or the size of the blockholding that was
more relevant. The results are not sensitive to the
use of a dummy blockholder variable.
Alternative dependent variables
We create an ordinal dependent variable of audit
quality from the ACEXP and ACIND variables
and employ a multinomial logit regression. For
this model the dependent variable is set to 0 if both
ACEXP and ACIND are zero; 1 if either (but not
both) ACEXP and ACIND are 1; and 2 if both
ACEXP and ACIND are 1. This allows us to com-
pare audit committees that do not meet the guide-
lines with those that are partly compliant and to
compare the latter with those that are fully compli-
ant. Only leverage is significant (at the 0.05 level)
in explaining the incremental audit committee
quality between the dependent variable of 0 and 1
whereas BDIND and BDSIZE are significant de-
terminants of audit committee quality when the de-
pendent is between 1 and 2. This suggests that there
are some firms (i.e. the lower quality audit com-
mittee firms) where audit committee membership
is not influenced by board size and composition.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is a potential concern because
of the significant correlations between a few vari-
ables that can be observed in Table 5. We therefore
run an ordinary least squares regression on the
ACBP model, to assess the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for each variable. The VIF factors
range from 1.1 to 1.24, which suggests that multi-
collinearity is not a problem.
However, there is still a concern over the corre-
lation between leverage (LEV) and growth oppor-
tunities (MTB) because of the theoretical relation
between these variables and the correlations ob-
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 403
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served in Table 5. We re-ran the ACBP logit re-
gression dropping LEV and MTB in turn. If MTB
is eliminated, LEV is not significant and the model
has a lower R2 and classification ability. When
leverage is dropped from the regression, MTB is
significant (at the 10% level) and the R2 and clas-
sification ability marginally increase.
Endogeneity
The hypotheses assume that the board character-
istics have a unidirectional effect on the composi-
tion of the audit committee. However, board and
board committee structure may be established si-
multaneously. That is, while board (BDSIZE) and
the percentage of independent directors (BDIND)
may affect the composition of the audit committee,
the composition of the audit committee may affect
board size and the proportion of independent di-
rectors. For example, a desire to create an inde-
pendent audit committee with a financial expert
may require the appointment of more directors
who are independent or financial experts to the
board.
We address this concern using a two-stage ap-
proach. We use the lagged board size as an instru-
mental variable for BDSIZE. The lagged variable
is assumed to be a predetermined variable in equa-
tion (1) because its value is not determined in the
current time period. Therefore, it is assumed that
the error term of the model is not correlated with
the lagged variable (e.g. Gujarati, 2003: 736).
In the first stage of the approach, BDSIZE is re-
gressed on the other explanatory variables in
model (1) plus the lagged value of BDSIZE. Data
for BDSIZE for the 2000 year was hand-collected
from annual reports. Equation (2) shows the OLS
regression:
BDSIZEt = Π0 + Π1LogLEVt + (2)
Π2LogEXDIRSHt + Π3BLOCKt + 
Π4BIG5t + Π5MTB + 
Π6BDSIZEt–1 + Π7BDINDt
We normalise LEV and EXDIRSH by taking
logs. The other variables are defined in equation 1.
In the second stage, the predicted value of BDSIZE
replaces the actual value of in the original model.
Table 7 contains the results. When the predicted
value of board size is included in the model, the 
results are qualitatively the same as in Table 6.
Thus, simultaneity does not seem to be affecting
our results.
6. Discussion
Our results have several implications for policy
setters. First, the low influence of demand factors
suggests that regulation will be necessary to move
audit committee quality to international standards.
Second, if existing (unconstrained) board struc-
tures are optimal from production efficiency per-
spective, then regulations will require firms to en-
gage additional directors or to change of duties of
existing directors.
To gain further insight on the latter issue, we
analyse the change in audit committee composi-
tion from 1998 to 2001.11 Over this period, eight
firms (15%) moved to achieve best practice audit
committee guidelines. For these firms, five firms
increased the number of directors, while two firms
achieved best practice audit committees by reallo-
cation of tasks within the existing board size. One
remaining company reduced the board size by two
members over the period and subsequently delist-
ed. Board independence increased for four of the
firms, decreased for two of the firms and remained
unchanged for two of the remaining companies.
Directors fees increased by an average of
NZ$10,042 for the eight companies. The change in
average directors’ fees was positive for all but one
of the eight firms. Interestingly, six other firms
moved away from best practice guidelines by los-
ing an accounting expert (two cases) or an inde-
pendent director (four cases) from the audit
committee. Only three of these firms reduced
board size, in other cases related party transactions
and changes in shareholding affected the inde-
pendence of directors. This suggests that firms
choose board structures for operational reasons –
or, at least, reasons unrelated to audit committee
best practice membership guidelines. As a result,
regulations to meet best practice audit committee
membership would impose a cost on these firms.
To get some idea of the cost, we analyse the 
average directors’ fees for each firm by audit com-
mittee quality (ACEXP and ACIND). This analy-
sis is reported in Table 8. Thirty-five firms have an
accounting expert on the audit committee. The me-
dian directors’ fee for these firms is NZ$31,000,
compared to those without an accounting expert of
NZ$17,250; a 79.7% increase. Similarly the medi-
an directors’ fees where ACIND is 1 is 18.7%
higher than those firms without an independent
audit committee.12 This suggests the cost, in terms
of directors’ fees, of increasing audit committee
quality will be significant for some firms. Given
economies of scale relating to firm size and the
strong relation between firm size and board size,
smaller firms will incur proportionally more costs
than large firms in increasing board size or im-
proving the mix of independent and expert direc-
tors. More specifically, the average cost of
complying with best practice guidelines will be de-
creasing with firm size. From a policy perspective,
404 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
11 This analysis is conducted on 52 firms because we lose
four observations for firms that were not listed in 1998.
12 Wilcoxon-matched pairs tests indicate these differences
are statistically significant.
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Table 7
Test for simultaneity
ACBP BDSIZE
Second Stage First Stage
Logit OLS
Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (p-value) (p-value)
Constant –7.488 –0.433
(0.013) (0.261)
LEV + –1.702 0.272
(0.226) (0.193)
EXDIRSH – 4.749 0.291
(0.189) (0.435)
BLOCK – 0.134 0.403
(0.468) (0.211)
BIG5 + 0.378 0.852
(0.391) (0.019)
MTB + –1.077 –0.129
(0.097) (0.082)
BDSIZE (predicted) + 0.551
(0.023)
BDSIZE (lagged) + 0.867
(0.000)
BDIND + 8.347 0.415
(0.001) (0.225)
–2 Log likelihood 39.128
Nagelkerke R2 0.611
% Predicted correct 83.929
The variables are described in Table 3. The sample size is 56. p-values are one-tailed.
Table 8
Analysis of average directors’ fee per firm (NZ$)
Percentage
Increase increase
ACEXP=1 ACEXP=0
Mean 32,661 20,196 12,465 61.7%
Median 31,000 17,250 13,750 79.7%
N 35 17
ACIND=1 ACIND=0
Mean 28,264 28,908 –643 –2.2%
Median 29,675 25,000 4,675 18.7%
N 26 26
See Table 2 for definitions of variables.
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whether such costs should be imposed on firms
needs to be weighed against the social benefits of
an increase in directors’ fees, such as a general im-
provement in investors’ confidence arising from
better financial reporting.
7. Summary
Regulators in the US, UK, Australia, and New
Zealand require or recommend that listed compa-
nies establish audit committees that meet specified
membership criteria. These requirements have
been made on the premise that if audit committees
are appropriately structured (i.e. are of high quali-
ty) their effectiveness should improve financial re-
porting.
This study investigates the characteristics asso-
ciated with firms that voluntarily established audit
committees that meet best practice guidelines for
audit committee membership. Our results show
that, in a voluntary setting, supply factors (i.e.
board size and board independence) are positively
related to best practice audit committees. The hy-
pothesised demand factors, such as leverage and
growth opportunities, large audit firms have weak
or no influence on audit committee membership.
There are two implications of our results for reg-
ulators. The first is that if audit committee mem-
bership is considered to be crucial for financial
reporting, then regulations will be necessary to
achieve best practice. Second, if, in a voluntary
setting, board composition is optimal for operating
purposes, the regulations to achieve audit commit-
tee best practice will impose significant costs on
some firms.
We note that New Zealand’s environment is
characterised by smaller firms, more concentrated
ownership, and limited resources with regard to di-
rectors. Therefore, care should be taken in gener-
alising the results to other settings.
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